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Abstract
In thinking about the rise of the Anthropocene, an important facet of this looming new era 
remains under-explored: namely, how cultural identity, and its tangible and intangible markers, 
are to be renegotiated and protected. Notwithstanding that the origins of international heritage 
law lie in protecting heritage in times of crisis (wartime and natural or man-made disasters), 
regimes under UNESCO for safeguarding cultural heritage in international law are ill-prepared 
for the challenges of the Anthropocene. A particular question that needs to be considered is the 
protection in international law of cultural heritage and identity when communities are displaced 
from their homes. Because international cultural heritage law is connected to state territoriality, 
states have the ultimate authorizing power over the meanings and uses of cultural heritage. In 
the past, this power has at times been used to the detriment of minority groups contesting the 
majoritarian state. But how might this power play out in a context where communities are forced 
to move? What, if anything, can international heritage law do to ensure that these populations, 
who have already lost their homes and livelihoods, can maintain their cultural identity through 
the protection of their heritage? I argue that international law’s separation between the cultural 
and biological facets of human existence presents a major obstacle to safeguarding the cultures 
of migrant and refugee groups, ultimately frustrating the very objectives that this separation was 
meant to achieve, namely, the protection of these populations. Only by reintegrating biology and 
culture can international law create the means for reimagining civilization in the Anthropocene.
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I.  INTRODUCTION
The rise of the Anthropocene draws increasing attention in the social 
sciences more generally. And, yet, much of the concern relates to the 
immediate impact on human livelihoods, comprising access to clean 
water, food, sanitation, and disappearing territory. Those questions are 
indeed most pressing and urgent, but in focusing on them, we also create 
a blind spot that prevents us from thinking beyond that immediacy. More 
specifically, when we think about our responses to the Anthropocene, 
much of our focus seems to be somewhat dystopian, told in a language 
of crisis in which our social and cultural systems will collapse, and a 
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version of the state of nature will set in.
The bright side of that framing is that it is a powerful call to action. 
Framed as a crisis,1 the Anthropocene and its potential consequences 
become unavoidable, as is the need to address and adapt to them. 
But there is also a dark side: our consistent focus is on the biological 
elements of human survival as a race, forgetting that, if we are to be 
more than a race, and be in fact a civilization, there are other elements 
that are equally important to consider. That is the powerful inclination I 
wish to push against in this article.
International law has long articulated a separation between the 
biological and cultural aspects of human existence. This separation 
can be seen from the fact that, for instance, the Genocide Convention,2 
excluded late in its drafting the idea of cultural genocide.3 Conversely, 
international law addressing culture has for the most part, and until 
recently, excluded the connection between cultural heritage and human 
goals, instead of focusing on civilization as filtered by a class of experts 
one step removed from the everyday practice and attachment to said 
culture.4 This gap has significant ripple effects in how we imagine 
humanity in times of crises: either as human groups upon whom crisis 
bears so heavily that their culture no longer matters; or as culture 
whose safeguarding is a low priority unless an expert-driven voice of 
the “international community” says they are worthy of our attention. 
Nothing could be further from the truth.
Human groups move from assemblages of individuals towards 
communities on the basis of a shared culture. This shared culture 
enables a sense of belonging, of existing; it allows for better outcomes 
for groups as they move across borders, whether voluntarily or forcibly; 
it generates resilience in the face of vulnerability; it galvanizes action 
and provides hope. Yet, international law’s separation of culture and 
1  Hilary Charlesworth, “International Law: A Discipline of Crisis,” The Modern Law 
Review 65:3, (2002).
2  Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened 
for signature 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 277 (entered into force 12 January 1951).
3  Elisa Novic, The Concept of Cultural Genocide: An International Law Perspective, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
4  Lucas Lixinski, “International Cultural Heritage Regimes, International Law and 
the Politics of Expertise,” International Journal of Cultural Property 20:4 (2013).
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biology does not allow us to make those linkages clearly, and, as we 
discuss and prepare responses to the imminent or already ongoing 
consequences of the Anthropocene, it is urgent that we bridge that gap.
In this article, I wish to focus on one aspect of the international 
legal response to the Anthropocene in the context of the culture-biology 
gap. Specifically, I will examine the cultural rights of migrants and 
refugees with respect to their cultural heritage. I focus on groups whose 
movement has been forced, either by reason of persecution, economic 
need, or disappearing territory. I exclude for our present purposes of 
voluntary migration. In the context of forced movement, I argue that 
international law’s separation between the cultural and biological 
facets of human existence presents a major obstacle to safeguarding 
the cultures of migrant and refugee groups, ultimately frustrating the 
very objectives that this separation was meant to achieve, namely, the 
protection of these populations. It is therefore urgent that we bridge 
that gap. For international law more generally, bridging the gap means 
international legal responses that move beyond the short-sighted 
immediacy of our perception of a crisis, bringing along better outcomes 
for affected human groups, and a reimagining of how we perceive 
threats posed to our existence not just as biological entities, but as a 
civilization. For international cultural heritage law, it means breathing 
life into the “human dimension” of cultural heritage and making a 
reality of the promise of cultural heritage as a means to promote human 
emancipation and other rights-related goals.
In order to support this claim, the article proceeds as follows: 
the next section (2) focuses on a discussion of international cultural 
heritage law in the Anthropocene, highlighting existing regimes and 
instruments under the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Next, I will focus on the often-
neglected matter of the discussion of the cultural rights of migrants and 
refugees as an international legal concern (3). Taken together, these 
sections will more clearly delineate the biology-culture gap mentioned 
above and will provide the basis for a discussion of state international 
legal obligations towards the cultural heritage of migrant and refugee 
groups, whether they are the state of origin of these groups (4) or the 
receiving state (5). On that basis, I will briefly discuss the need to 
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untether international law on culture from territoriality and the nation-
state, an important if elusive and aspirational challenge (6). Concluding 
remarks follow (7).
II. INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL HERITAGE LAW IN THE 
ANTHROPOCENE
Cultural heritage, in international law, is a broad and fairly 
fragmented category. Under UNESCO standard-setting instruments, 
it comprises manifestations of culture as varied as monuments and 
sites,5 cultural objects,6 shipwrecks and other underwater artifacts and 
installations,7 buildings or groups of buildings,8 archives,9 landscapes,10 
and manifestations of living heritage known as intangible cultural 
heritage (comprising social rituals, dance, music, festivals, legal 
systems and other ways of knowing nature and the universe).11 Over 
time, newer instruments have been designed (and old ones revised 
through their implementation guidelines) so as to focus increasingly on 
living cultures, which has both a tangible (the connection that people 
feel to sites and objects) and intangible dimension (social practices that 
may or may not involve physical heritage).12
UNESCO activity with respect to heritage has often gained 
momentum in the aftermath of a crisis. The first treaty under its aegis, 
5  Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, 
opened for signature 16 November 1972, 1037 UNTS 151 (entered into force 15 De-
cember 1975) (WHC), Art. 1.
6  Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export 
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, opened for signature 14 November 
1970, 823 UNTS 231 (entered into force 24 April 1972) (1970 Convention), Art.1.
7  Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, opened for sig-
nature 2 November 2001, 2562 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 January 2009) (UCHC), 
Art. 1(1).
8  WHC, Art. 1.
9  1970 Convention, Art. 1(j).
10  UNESCO Recommendation on the Historic Urban Landscape, including a glossary 
of definitions (adopted 10 November 2011).
11  Convention for Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, opened for sig-
nature 17 October 2003, 2368 UNTS 3 (entered into force 20 April 2006) (ICHC), 
Art. 2(1).
12  Lucas Lixinski, Intangible Cultural Heritage in International Law, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2013.
5Lucas Lixinski
the 1954 Hague Convention on Cultural Property in Wartime,13 responds 
directly to the pillage and destruction of cultural heritage during World 
War II.14 Likewise, the World Heritage Convention (WHC) gained 
international diplomatic momentum for its adoption in no small part 
because of the flooding of Venice and Florence.15 Therefore, the 
evolution of the international legal safeguarding of cultural heritage is 
closely tied with crises.
One of the effects of this tie is that several UNESCO instruments 
contain specific language that protects heritage in difficult times. The 
WHC, for instance, includes specific language on disasters, and creates 
as a special mechanism a List of World Heritage in Danger.16 This list 
is meant to further galvanize international action to safeguard heritage 
threatened by major changes in human societies (even if in recent 
practice it has been more often than not perceived as simply a “naming 
and shaming” device).17
Threats to heritage brought about by the Anthropocene effectively 
split heritage into two large domains : a heritage that is inextricably, 
and as a matter of fact, tied to a territory (such as world heritage and 
underwater heritage); and heritage that is not tied to a territory (such as 
13  Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 
with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, opened for signature 14 May 
1954, 249 UNTS 240 (entered into force 7 August 1956) (1954 Hague Convention).
14  See generally Lynn H. Nicholas, The Rape of Europa: The Fate of Europe’s Trea-
sures in the Third Reich and the Second World War, Vintage Books, 1995.
15  See generally Rodney Harrison, Heritage: Critical Approaches, Routledge, 2013.
16  WHC, Art. 11(4): “The Committee shall establish, keep up to date and publish, 
whenever circumstances shall so require, under the title of “List of World Heritage 
in Danger”, a list of the property appearing in the World Heritage List for the con-
servation of which major operations are necessary and for which assistance has been 
requested under this Convention. […] The list may include only such property form-
ing part of the cultural and natural heritage as is threatened by serious and specific 
dangers, such as the threat of disappearance caused by […] the outbreak or the threat 
of an armed conflict; calamities and cataclysms; serious fires, earthquakes, landslides; 
volcanic eruptions; changes in water level, floods and tidal waves. The Committee 
may at any time, in case of urgent need, make a new entry in the List of World Heri-
tage in Danger and publicize such entry immediately.”
17  Magdalena Marcinkowska, “Between Exclusion and Inclusion: On the Challeng-
es Facing World Heritage Preservation Efforts: Interview with Mechtild Rössler”, 
Santander Art and Culture Law Review, vol. 3, no. 2, 2017.
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movable and intangible heritage). This categorization matters because 
responses will be very different : heritage tied to territory is at the mercy 
of changes brought about by the Anthropocene, whereas other heritage 
can, at least, as a matter of fact, be displaced in response to changes. 
The primary focus of this article is on the latter category. Intangible 
cultural heritage, in particular has been the object of specific analysis in 
the context of climate change, suggesting that stronger safeguarding of 
(intangible) cultural heritage is needed in countries more exposed to the 
effects of climate change.18
In the former category, though, Venice is a key example. As 
a World Heritage Site, and the object of a key campaign that led to 
the adoption of the World Heritage Convention, this archipelagic city 
is an international symbol of cultural heritage-related responses to 
Anthropocene challenges. As the city is threatened by rising sea-levels, 
commentators remind us that, as important as the plight of Venetians is :
“when you think about the loss of Venice, [it is] not the Venetians 
who are the topmost on most people’s minds[ it is] the loss of a 
beautiful and historic city that has played an enormous role in the 
development of Western Civilization. […] The loss of Venice is 
about the loss of a part of ourselves that reaches back in time and 
binds us together as civilized people.”19
With respect to the other category of heritage for our purposes, 
though, the challenge rests not with what is possible as a matter of fact, 
but rather as a matter of law. Because of our state-centric paradigm in 
international law, heritage is conceptualized and safeguarded in its ties 
to a territorial state. So, movable heritage is closely tied to national 
identity, and existing instruments prevent its movement across borders 
without the authorization of the territorial state;20 intangible heritage is 
safeguarded only within the boundaries of the state party that recognizes 
said intangible heritage as important.21
18  Hee-Eun Kim, “Changing Climate, Changing Culture: Adding the Climate Change 
Dimension to the Protection of Intangible Cultural Heritage”, International Journal 
of Cultural Property, vol. 18, 2011, 259.
19  Jeff Goodell, The Water Will Come: Rising Seas, Sinking Cities, and the Remaking 
of the Civilized World, Black Inc., 2017.
20  1970 Convention, Arts.,  6-7.
21  ICHC, Art. 11.
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This state-centrism, and ensuring territorial connection is at odds 
with the nature of the heritage, but it aligns with the international legal 
paradigm under which the relevant treaties were concluded.22 A key 
consequence of this alignment is the severing of ties between heritage 
and communities or groups, even if they could be useful to promote 
resilience and adaptation to Anthropocene-related events.23 In this 
way, international heritage law’s enabling of the uses of heritage for 
nationalistic projects and its ensuing tie to territory helps create and 
reinforce the biology-culture divide. The biology-culture divide is 
further reinforced in the Anthropocene or climate change discourse, 
where culture-related aspects are seldom mentioned, and biological 
or natural aspects are foregrounded. That happens even within 
UNESCO, in its reporting on the matter (led by the science branch 
of the organization).24 Further, international law’s categorization into 
subfields and silos maintains the divide in ways that fail to “reflect the 
messy, complex interconnectedness of the issue” of climate change and 
the Anthropocene.25
This close tie to territory is a product of UNESCO standard-setting, 
though, and does not match pre-UNESCO practice with respect to 
movable heritage in particular. As documented by Andrzej Jakubowski, 
there is abundant state practice prior to relevant UNESCO treaties 
that suggests that a people’s cultural heritage follows the people first, 
and territory second.26 It was with the advent of UNESCO, and the 
decolonization process in Africa and Asia that heritage was once again 
22  For a collection of essays considering cultural heritage and climate change beyond 
the law, see David C. Harvey and Jim Perry, eds., The Future of Heritage as Climates 
Change: Loss, Adaptation and Creativity, Routledge, 2015.
23  Kim, see note 19, 269.
24  As discussed by Kim, Ibid, 270-271. See also a recent issue of the UNESCO Cou-
rier, the organization’s premier public outreach vehicle, dedicated to the Anthropo-
cene. It does not mention cultural heritage at all, and mentions social and cultural 
aspects only inasmuch as they relate to impacts of the Anthropocene on geophysical 
features. UNESCO, “Welcome to the Anthropocene!”, The UNESCO Courier, April-
June 2018.
25  Mutatis mutandis, see Jane McAdam, “Environmental Migration” in Alexander 
Betts, ed., Global Migration Governance, Oxford University Press, 2011, 159 (refer-
ring more broadly to the problem of climate-induced migration).
26  Andrzej Jakubowski, State Succession in Cultural Property, Oxford University 
Press, 2015, 323.
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tied to (artificial)27 territorial boundaries. An unintended consequence 
of this tie is an entire set of regimes under UNESCO that replicate 
and reinforce territoriality and matching statehood at the expense of 
cultural ties that people may have to their own culture. This mismatch 
is particularly experienced with respect to the heritage of migrant or 
refugee groups, discussed in the next section.
III. MIGRANTS, REFUGEES, AND CULTURAL HERITAGE
The biology-culture divide exists as well in the legal regimes that 
focus on the rights of migrants and refugees, in spite of the widespread 
acknowledgment of cultural elements being integral to the identification 
and unity of diasporic groups.28 In these treaties, including most notably 
the 1951 Refugee Convention29 and the International Convention on 
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
their Families (CRMW),30 there is no reference to culture in relation 
to these groups, let alone cultural heritage. A recent report from the 
International Organization for Migration on indigenous international 
migrants, for instance, makes no reference to culture, even if indigenous 
rights in general are often framed around culture.31 And an extensive 
proposal for a treaty-specific for persons displaced by climate change, 
while acknowledging the important role of culture as a background 
consideration, dedicates very little space to the discussion of cultural 
27  Makau Mutua, “Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry”, 
Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 16, 1995.
28  Lester Edwin J. Ruiz, “In Pursuit of the ‘Body Politic’: Ethics, Spirituality, and 
Diaspora”, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, vol. 9, 1999, 636-637.
29  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 
189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954) (Refugee Convention).
30  International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of their Families, opened for signature 18 December 1990, 2220 UNTS 
3 (entered into force 1 July 2003) (CRMW).
31  Erika Yamada and Marcelo Torelly, eds., Aspectos jurídicos da atenção aos in-
dígenas migrantes da Venezuela para o Brasil, Organização Internacional para as 
Migrações, 2018. For the connection between indigenous rights advocacy and culture, 
with a critical analysis of its unintended consequences, see Karen Engle, The Elu-
sive Promise of Indigenous Development: Culture, Rights, Strategy, Duke University 
Press, 2010.
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rights of these migrants.32 Yet, it is well-documented that migrant and 
refugee groups constitute diasporas that are connected via their cultural 
heritage and practices. Why is there such a disconnect between the law 
and the reality of these communities ?
Part of the reason is the mentality of the urgency of crises involving 
mass displacement of people, discussed in the previous section. The 
only concern is the immediate biological survival of the individuals in 
those groups, who are treated as such. It is very little in international 
law and the individual rights paradigm reining under it since after 
World War II that refers to migrants or refugees as collectivities, even 
if their flows often happen collectively. Therefore, by being treated as 
individuals, it is easy to focus on their biological existence, and neglect 
the elements that bind these individuals together, namely, their shared 
culture and heritage. Even if the Refugee Convention requires persons 
claiming refugee status to prove their belonging to a persecuted group,33 
cultural belonging is only used to inform an individual’s situation, and 
is thus only part of the background or factual matrix of the assessment, 
rather than a key concern. The focus is not in redressing the persecution 
of the group as such, but rather allowing the individual entry into the 
territory of the receiving state. An unintended consequence of this “de-
culturalization” of refugees and migrants, particularly refugees, is that 
it makes it easier to dehumanize them, which is a crucial problem in 
refugee law- and policy-making.34
Secondly, there is an obvious disinterest from states in adding 
cultural protections to relevant instruments and regimes, whether they 
32  David Hodgkinson and others, “The Hour when the Ship Comes In’: A Convention 
for Persons Displaced by Climate Change”, Monash University Law Review, vol. 
36, no. 1, 2010, 12 and 42 (on the importance of culture) and 44-45 (on intangible 
cultural heritage).
33  Refugee Convention, Art. 1: “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or 
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not 
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as 
a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”
34  Victoria M. Esses, “Immigration, Migration, and Culture” in Oliver Braddick and 
others, eds., Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Psychology, Oxford University Press, 
2018.
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are the sending or the receiving state. For sending states (or the states 
of origin of these groups), often the reasons why these groups leave is 
because they are being persecuted (particularly in the case of refugees). 
And the persecution of these groups means there is little to no interest 
in preserving their culture. Even if the cause of distress is the state’s 
failure by virtue of conflict, one can hardly expect a failed state to be 
able to address issues around culture and heritage, particularly since 
these considerations are traditionally treated as secondary.
From the perspective of receiving states, there is also little to no 
interest in providing protection to the culture and heritage of incoming 
groups of migrants or refugees. Not only is there a risk that the receiving 
state may run afoul its international obligations if, for instance, it 
allows refugees to bring movable heritage (under the terms of the 
1970 Convention, as discussed above), but, perhaps most crucially, 
protecting cultural distinctiveness of incoming migrants and refugees 
can destabilize (even if only momentarily) the receiving state’s social 
structures, a concern even in multicultural states. Further, incoming 
foreigners have no political rights in the receiving polity, and their 
concerns can thus easily be pushed aside.
Nevertheless, culture is centrally important to refugee or migrant 
groups, especially nationals of small island nations, upon whom the 
impacts of the Anthropocene are being felt first.35 Particularly important 
in this respect is a cultural heritage that is not inextricably tied to the 
land, since it can move across borders. Intangible cultural heritage is 
notably mentioned in studies of migration and culture, particularly 
as tied to religion36 and culinary practices.37 It is important to note, 
though, that the current international legal regime on intangible cultural 
heritage largely excludes religion per se,38 and that food practices that 
35  For a collection of essays tying cultures and small island nations, see Tim Curtis, 
ed., Islands as Crossroads: Sustaining Cultural Diversity in Small Island Developing 
States, UNESCO Publishing, 2011.
36  Ajaya Kumar Sahoo and Dave Sangha, “Diaspora and cultural heritage: the case 
of Indians in Canada”, Asian Ethnicity, vol. 11, no.1, 2010, 81-94 and 88-89.
37  Pnina Werbner, “Migration and Culture” in Marc R. Rosenblum and Daniel J. 
Tichenor, eds., Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International Migration, Oxford 
University Press, 2012, 215-242 and 221-230.
38  See Benedetta Ubertazzi, “Article 2(2)” in Janet Blake and Lucas Lixinski, eds., 
Commentary to the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural 
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have gained international recognition as cultural heritage are only those 
suggested by the territorial state, therefore tending to be quintessentially 
national (such as the French gastronomic meal). Some cross-border 
culinary practices have gained recognition as cultural heritage, though, 
pointing that it may be possible to engage certain traditions brought 
in by migrant groups that way.39 Further, cultural objects that embody 
intangible heritage, particularly those of everyday life, help enliven 
diasporic culture and practices.40
Further, refugee and migrant groups’ ability to bring and maintain 
some of their heritage paradoxically can facilitate their process of 
integration in the receiving state,41 as supported by psychological 
studies in this area.42 It is therefore in said state’s interest to protect 
their heritage and cultural rights, and have their heritage recorded and 
safeguarded in museums and other cultural institutions,43 even if they 
do not have the political agency to demand so of the state. Cultural 
institutions, in particular, by validating the refugee or migrant group’s 
culture, can validate said culture and enhance its value even for the 
community themselves (let alone for the host state).44 There is of course 
a risk, however, that these institutions will replace migrant and refugee 
groups’ agency in determining the fate of their own culture, and that is 
a risk to be avoided, particularly within the host state.
But how can and do these interests translate into international legal 
obligations, either as a matter of existing international law (lege lata) or 
aspirational obligations (lege ferenda)? The next two sections explore 
some of these possibilities, from the perspectives of states of origin of 
migrants and refugees as well as receiving states.
Heritage, Oxford University Press, forthcoming (manuscript on file). 
39  For a survey of international legal responses to food as cultural heritage, see Lucas 
Lixinski, “Food as heritage and multi-level international legal governance”, Interna-
tional Journal of Cultural Property (forthcoming 2018).
40  Saphinaz-Amal Naguib, “Museums, Diaspora and the Sustainability of Intangible 
Cultural Heritage”, Sustainability, vol. 5, 2013.
41  Werbner, see note 38, 215.
42  Esses, see note 38.
43  Naguib, see note 41.
44  Ibid, 2186.
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IV. OBLIGATIONS OF THE STATE OF ORIGIN
As indicated above, obligations imposed on the state of origin 
of migrant groups are difficult to specify and enforce, as these states 
are often troubled or even failing or failed states. Because of these 
difficulties, many of these obligations are de lege ferenda, but they are 
grounded in existing international law. A challenge in identifying these 
obligations lies in the biology-culture divide, in that it prevents the 
dialogue between cultural heritage obligations (normally interpreted as 
rights of states over “their” heritage) and other bodies of international 
law more attentive to the needs of migrant and refugee groups (which 
tend to focus on biological, rather than cultural, needs). That said, 
existing or aspirational international legal obligations can be identified 
with respect to three different phases: the migrant or refugee group’s 
departure; the group’s separation from the state of origin; and possibly 
their return to the state of origin.
With respect to obligations upon the group’s departure, a key 
obligation related to cultural heritage is to allow safe passage of cultural 
objects and artifacts that speak primarily to that group’s cultural 
heritage. Those artifacts can either be themselves the heritage (in the 
sense of the 1970 Convention), or they can be (alternatively or in 
addition) instruments for the practice of the group’s intangible cultural 
heritage. To be sure, the line of what is that group’s heritage versus the 
shared heritage or identity of other groups within the nation is often 
blurred, as states often, in their multicultural accommodation projects, 
weave minority heritage into narratives of national cultural identity. A 
test of cultural proximity is thus necessary, to decide whether a certain 
cultural artifact belongs primarily with the migrant or refugee group, 
or with another group (or even the nation-state as the representative of 
the collectivity). This test could be similar to existing tests that try and 
identify whether a certain practice is essential to a belief system for 
the purposes of freedom of belief and religion.45 If a certain practice is 
essential to the set of beliefs (which does not need to be a religion, it 
can be a set of cultural and social practices), then it warrants protection 
under international law. This test is in line with the balancing test applied 
45  European Commission on Human Rights, Arrowsmith v United Kingdom (Appli-
cation No 7050/75), Comm Rep 1978, 19 DR 5. For a further discussion, see Lixinski, 
see note 13, 166-167.
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by the Inter-American Court with respect to the competing rights of 
indigenous peoples and private parties.46 In determining who could 
exercise the same right over the same interest (in the Inter-American 
Court’s case, fittingly for our purposes, the right to property), the Court 
considered the right’s relationship to the core of the identity of the 
affected parties. Transposing both tests to our present context, it means 
that, if the artifact in question is essential for a certain cultural practice, 
and said cultural practice is more important for the continuation of the 
group’s identity than it is for other stakeholders, then the leaving group 
should be entitled to take said object with them upon their departure. It 
thus falls on the state of origin to issue the export certificate required by 
the 1970 Convention47 in order to ensure the safe passage of the artifact.
After the group’s departure, and during their time away from the 
state of origin, there are two key obligations upon the state, both of 
which being primarily negative (but with corresponding positive duties). 
Specifically, they are obligations not to impair or destroy conditions 
tied to the continuity of the culture and heritage of the departing group. 
Those are obligations not to destroy (or allow others to destroy, or to 
allow to fall into disrepair) cultural heritage, whether sites or objects, 
that are central to the group’s culture but have stayed in the state of 
origin. Similarly, the state has an obligation not to retaliate (or allow 
others to retaliate) against members of the departing group that may 
have left, by preventing or punishing cultural practices. Sadly, often 
enough the latter happens (even if it can amount to the international 
crime of persecution), particularly when the group is persecuted in their 
state of origin. In those cases, it is incumbent on any of the parties 
to a relevant heritage treaty to enforce relevant international legal 
obligations as erga omnes partes,48 even if there are notable practical 
difficulties with this approach, the discussion of which goes beyond the 
scope of this article.49
46  Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Para-
guay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, IACtHR Series C no 125, 17 June 2005, paras. 
146-148.
47  1970 Convention, Art. 6.
48  See eg Francesco Francioni, “Beyond State Sovereignty: The Protection of Cultural 
Heritage as a Shared Interest of Humanity”, Michigan Journal of International Law, 
vol. 25, 2003-2004.
49  But see Lucas Lixinski and Vassilis Tzevelekos, “The Strained, Elusive and Wide-
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And, should the group ever return to the state of origin, the said state 
is under an obligation to welcome back the group and accommodate their 
culture, on the group’s own terms and in accordance with their expressed 
desires, in national multicultural projects. That accommodation is 
particularly important as culture is transformed in the receiving state, 
or, more drastically, the diaspora becomes the only place where the 
heritage is practiced.50 Those obligations mean allowing artifacts to be 
brought back into the country, and also allowing these communities to 
(re-)occupy spaces they have traditionally used for cultural practices, 
even if they may have been listed as protected monuments since the 
group’s departure and are considered out of bounds for everyday use 
by virtue of domestic heritage law. State duties in this area can also 
extend to the inclusion of cultural and social practices into national 
inventories of intangible cultural heritage, with the consequent funds 
necessary for the safeguarding of said heritage, particularly important 
given the likely urgency of safeguarding these fragile re-introduced 
cultural manifestations.
Out of these three moments (upon departure, during time away, 
upon return), the obligations upon departure are the ones most solidly 
grounded upon existing law (de lege lata), using a combination of 
existing international cultural heritage law and international human 
rights law. Other obligations either depend on the implementation of 
doctrines that currently exist in international law in theory, but that 
present practical or political difficulties, like erga omnes partes. But the 
survey above shows that there are important elements that cannot be 
disregarded by states of origin, even when their policies and practices 
are the reason why people are displacing themselves. The state that 
receives these groups also has a number of obligations, some of which 
mirror or follow directly from the state of origin’s obligations in this 
space, and others that respond to idiosyncrasies of the receiving state. 
These are the object of the next section.
Ranging Relationship between International Cultural Heritage Law and the Law of 
State Responsibility: From Collective Enforcement to Concurrent Responsibility” in 
Alessandro Chechi and Marc-Andre Renold, eds., Cultural Heritage Law and Ethics: 
Mapping Recent Developments, Schulthess, 2017.
50  Naguib, see note 41, 2183.
15
Lucas Lixinski
V. OBLIGATIONS OF THE RECEIVING STATE
In theory, the receiving state is best placed to do more with respect 
to safeguarding the heritage of migrant and refugee groups (at least 
the heritage, as discussed above, that is not inextricably tied to the 
territory). That said, as also mentioned above, there are fewer incentives 
for the receiving state to take action. The migrant or refugee groups 
do not have political rights in the new polity immediately, meaning 
they cannot influence domestic law- and policy-making in their favor, 
nor can express their grievances through the electoral process. They 
“are considered as mere instruments of economic and demographic 
planning, not as human beings endowed with dignity and rights.”51 
Further, it is not in the interest of many receiving states to undertake 
action they often perceive as disruptive of their own cultural heritage 
and identity narratives (a “fantasy of domination” in which refugees 
and other migrants “take over” the state, being incumbent upon the 
state “to either restore or maintain a ‘proper’ balance to multicultural 
diversity”).52 Finally, the obligations upon receiving states have to do 
with the immediate accommodation of incoming individuals, measured 
against their biological existence, rather than the structural causes 
that led them to flee as individuals or groups, which often connect to 
culture but also mean scrutinizing the internal situation in another state 
(their domain réservé).53 Therefore, reasons for traditional voluntarist 
international legal structures and the biology-culture divide contribute 
to reducing the scope of presently expected obligations incumbent 
upon receiving states with respect to the cultural heritage of incoming 
migrant and refugee groups.
However, there are reasons to rethink this status quo. First, there are a 
range of long-term benefits for accommodating the culture and heritage 
of migrant and refugee groups, particularly in that groups whose culture 
51  Alessandro Chechi, “Migrants’ Cultural Rights at the Confluence of International 
Human Rights Law and International Cultural Heritage Law”, International Human 
Rights Law Review vol. 5, 2016, 36.
52  Sara Dehm and Max Walden, “Refugee Policy: A Cruel Bipartisanship” in Anika 
Gauja and others, eds., Double Disillusion: The 2016 Australian Federal Election, 
ANU Press, 2018, 602.
53  Janet Blake, International Cultural Heritage Law, Oxford University Press, 2015, 
282.
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of origin is better safeguarded in a new state settle more easily and start 
contributing to that society more quickly.54 This idea is somewhat of a 
paradox, considering many states still believe integration into the pre-
existing social and cultural structures is key. But one thing does not 
preclude the other, and in effect studies show that they are mutually 
reinforcing. There is therefore a strong incentive for safeguarding the 
culture of origin of migrants and refugees. This incentive, however, is 
sadly unlikely to work in short election cycles, which is how statecraft 
is often measured these days, particularly with respect to refugee and 
migration policy.55
Nevertheless, there are three categories of obligations that receiving 
states have with respect to incoming migrant or refugee groups. Like 
the obligations of states of origin, these are classified in relation to the 
“lifecycle” of a migrant or refugee group in the state, thus including 
the group’s arrival, their settlement or “integration”, and, if applicable, 
their departure, either to return to the state of origin or to a new territory.
With respect to the group’s arrival, the key obligation upon the 
receiving state is to allow entry of artifacts belonging to said group. 
This obligation largely mirrors the one discussed in the previous section 
with respect to the group’s departure from their state of origin, and the 
same test is drawn from international human rights law as to the relative 
importance of the artifact to that group’s culture applies. But there are 
also some important caveats. One of them is that, under the terms of 
the 1970 Convention, the state would be under the obligation to return 
the object to the state of origin if it has been brought into their territory 
without a valid export permit.56 However, if the group in question is 
being persecuted, particularly on cultural grounds (widely understood 
here, to include at least religion and ethnicity), then the state of origin 
is unlikely to issue the export permit, particularly if the state also sees 
itself as having a claim (based on cultural or economic considerations) 
over the artifact. In this instance, it is upon the receiving state to consider 
their obligations under the 1970 Convention among their duties to these 
migrants or refugees, which includes an obligation not to prevent these 
54  Chechi, see note 52, 28.
55  See generally Dehm and Walden, see note 53.
56  1970 Convention, Art. 7.
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groups from maintaining their cultural links.57 Therefore, the biology-
culture gap needs to be bridged so that a claim over a cultural artefact 
be understood not simply as a claim over an object belonging to a state 
(the framing in the 1970 Convention, read in isolation), but rather as 
the balancing of the interest of a state over an object versus the group’s 
right to their cultural identity.
Moreover, there are obligations upon the receiving state as the 
group settles into the social and cultural environment of the receiving 
state. These have been articulated by the United Nations Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) with respect to the 
right to participate in cultural life.58
The CESCR issued a general comment to this provision in 2009,59 
which discusses the scope of the right to participate in cultural life 
more broadly. Importantly, this general comment discusses the rights 
of migrants to participate in cultural life. The Committee indicated that 
states:
“should pay particular attention to the protection of the cultural identities 
of migrants, as well as their language, religion and folklore, and of their 
right to hold cultural, artistic and intercultural events. States parties 
should not prevent migrants from maintaining their cultural links with 
their countries of origin”60 
This provision is in line with the language in the CRMW.61 Note 
that the CESCR puts particular emphasis on intangible cultural heritage 
here, rather than artifacts. That may be because intangible cultural 
heritage is less controversial in relation to migrants and refugees 
(since the protection of movable cultural heritage, as discussed in the 
previous paragraph, could run afoul of obligations under the 1970 
57  CRMW Art. 31.
58  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signa-
ture 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976), Art. 15(a).
59  Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General comment No. 21: 
Right of everyone to take part in cultural life (art. 15, para. 1 (a), of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 (21 De-
cember 2009) (General Comment No. 21).
60  Ibid, para. 34.
61  CRMW, Art. 45: “1. Members of the families of migrant workers shall, in the State 
of employment, enjoy equality of treatment with nationals of that State in relation to: 
… (d) Access to and participation in cultural life.”
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Convention). But it is also the case that intangible cultural heritage 
is more important to this moment of an immigrant or refugee group’s 
journey in the receiving state, and that human rights apply more directly 
to the residence of the group in the receiving state, rather than the exact 
moment of their entry. Nevertheless, museums in the receiving state 
can play an important role, even if one must be wary that they do not 
overstep their mandate and become the sole authorizers of migrant or 
refugee heritage, as discussed above.62
The CESCR also indicates that states have an obligation:
“to facilitate the right of everyone to take part in cultural life by taking a 
wide range of positive measures, including financial measures, that would 
contribute to the realization of this right”
which includes taking: 
“appropriate measures or programmes to support minorities or other 
communities, including migrant communities, in their efforts to preserve 
their culture.”63 
International jurisprudence has acknowledged the right of migrant 
communities to maintain their cultural ties in spite of restrictions in the 
receiving state, through the right to freedom of expression64 and the 
right to freedom of association.65 In this connection, there is also an 
obligation upon states to take :
“appropriate measures to remedy structural forms of discrimination so as 
to ensure that the underrepresentation of persons from certain communities 
in public life does not adversely affect their right to take part in cultural 
life.”66 
In other words, it is upon the state not only to facilitate the 
preservation of migrant culture, but also to ensure that these groups 
62  Naguib, see note 41, 2187 (suggesting that “[u]ltimately, it is the museum who sets 
the structure on which to construct the heritage of migration and diasporas and who 
decides on its sustainability.”).
63  General Comment No. 21, para. 52(f).
64  European Court of Human Rights, Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v Sweden 
(Application No 23883/06), Judgment of 16 December 2008.
65  European Court of Human Rights, Sidiropoulos and Others v Greece (Application 
No. 26695/ 95), Judgment of 10 July 1998; European Court of Human Rights, Gorze-
lik and Others v Poland (Application No. 44158/98), Judgment of 17 February 2004.
66  General Comment No. 21, para. 52(g).
19
Lucas Lixinski
can participate in public life, and that the structural causes behind 
their persecution are addressed by the receiving state. This obligation 
is further compounded when there are intersectionality factors at play, 
such as the case of migrant or refugee children,67 older persons,68 or 
women.69 A few promising examples already exist in local practice, 
but they are more often than not restricted to major metropolitan areas 
and are still to have a widespread impact on national law- and policy-
making.70
Lastly, receiving states also have obligations vis-à-vis these migrant 
and refugee groups should they ever decide to leave, either back to 
their state of origin, or elsewhere. In this context, they become the state 
of origin, and the obligations discussed in the previous section apply. 
It is important here to bear in mind that these groups have the right to 
take their artifacts with them, even if the receiving state, in an effort to 
protect said artifacts in the interest of the migrant or refugee groups, 
or by virtue of this group’s integration and role in the social structures 
of the broader polity, considers said artifacts to also be part of their 
national heritage.
This survey of existing and aspirational obligations of both states 
of origin and receiving states of migrant and refugee groups shows that 
there is a wide range of international legal obligations that, interpreted 
67  International Labor Organization, Convention Concerning Migrations in Abusive 
Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant 
Workers, opened for signature 24 June 1975, 1120 UNTS 324 (entered into force 9 
December 1978), Art. 12: “Each Member shall, by methods appropriate to national 
conditions and practice … (f) take all steps to assist and encourage the efforts of mi-
grant workers and their families to preserve their national and ethnic identity and their 
cultural ties with their country of origin, including the possibility for children to be 
given some knowledge of their mother tongue…”
68  Laia Colomer, “Managing the heritage of immigrants. Elderly refugees, homesick-
ness, and cultural identities”, The European Archaeologist, vol. 39, 2013.
69  United Nations Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur in the 
field of cultural rights – Karima Bennoune”, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/59 (3 February 
2016), para. 38.
70  For instance, see Clara Arokiasamy, “Embedding shared heritage: the cultural heri-
tage rights of London’s African and Asian diaspora communities”, International Jour-
nal of Heritage Studies vol. 18, no. 3, 2012. Cf. Luann Good Gingrich, “Preserving 
Cultural Heritage in the Context of Migratory Livelihoods”, International Migration 
vol. 52, no. 3, 2014 (focusing on Mennonite migration to rural Canada).
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systemically, provide important guidance with respect to the importance 
to accommodate and protect the culture and heritage of these groups. 
This protection arises not out of alignment between these groups and 
a territorial state’s rights under international law, but it is rather based 
on the rights that migrant and refugee groups enjoy themselves, and 
obligations owed to them by states. The gap between culture and biology 
presents a major obstacle in identifying and applying these rights and 
obligations, though. The imperative to preserve the heritage of migrant 
and refugee groups highlights the shortcomings of this gap, alongside 
other basic pillars of international legal ordering, within and beyond the 
specific domain of cultural heritage law, to address the challenges of the 
Anthropocene.
VI. RETHINKING TERRITORIALITY AND STATEHOOD AS 
LINCHPINS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CULTURE
As indicated above, the territorial paradigm permeates cultural 
heritage and its safeguarding in international law, effectively preventing 
the recognition of the mobility of cultures that is so important to 
protecting, promoting, and fulfilling the rights of migrants and refugees. 
That link between heritage and territory, though, is not historically 
a given, and its contingencies need to be understood as a means of 
unpacking the possibilities of culture and (re)imagining international 
law in this area.71 Further, the idea of community coalescing its culture 
around territorially-based constructs has long been surpassed,72 even if 
UNESCO-era international law enshrines that type of understanding. 
And, since culture plays a key (if often underestimated) role in 
international law and relations,73 it is worth considering the implications 
of our rethinking of the relationship between culture and international 
law beyond cultural heritage law.
71  On the importance of contingencies in international legal thinking, see Ingo Ven-
zke, “What If? Counterfactual (Hi)Stories of International Law”, Asian Journal of 
International Law (advance publication 2017).
72  Werbner, see note 38, 216.
73  Jacinta O’Hagan, “Conflict, Convergence or Co-existence? The Relevance of Cul-
ture in Reframing World Order”, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, vol. 
9, 1999.
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Focusing on the history of state succession with respect to tangible 
cultural heritage, Andrzej Jakubowski has examined extensive practice 
regarding the movement of cultural artifacts and their relationship to 
peoples in contexts of fluid or moving state borders. Territoriality, he 
acknowledges, is a key principle connecting people, land, and heritage, 
going as far back as the nineteenth century. However, this principle 
evolved to make territory but a proxy for the idea of nation-state, when 
it came to cultural heritage.74 Particularly in the aftermath of World War 
II, state boundaries were in flux, and entire national or ethnic groups 
had been displaced as a result of the conflict. Thus, strict territoriality 
gave way to the recognition of the primacy of collective cultural rights, 
and cultural heritage was meant to follow the fate of these displaced 
groups.75 This idea, central as it was for the conceptual understanding of 
the relevance of heritage in the context of new and changing states, was 
not explicitly inserted in relevant arrangements, and, when UNESCO 
started undertaking the codification of international law in the area of 
cultural heritage protection and safeguarding, territorial provenance 
was reaffirmed and enshrined by default in the regime we today apply 
in international law with respect to culture.76
Key in this story is that the link between culture and territory is not 
a given, nor is it necessary; rather, it is a default position of a state-
centric international law. That it was subsequently reinforced during the 
decolonization process is relevant, but not essential, to understanding the 
purpose of international heritage law. During the decolonization process 
of Africa and Asia in the decades immediately after the foundation of 
the United Nations, the connection to territory was reinforced as a proxy 
for the emerging nation-state, but, in effect, heritage was needed to 
restore and galvanize the identity of the peoples of these new countries, 
much as it was important for the national identity of successor states in 
the nineteenth century.77
That territory was chosen has more to do with the limits of the 
decolonization itself than with heritage. More specifically, the formation 
of new states was closely tied to the uti possidetis principle, meaning 
74  Jakubowski, see note 28, 322.
75  Ibid, 323.
76  Ibid.
77  Ibid, 52.
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boundaries set by colonial powers, in full disregard of pre-existing 
ethnic or cultural lines, needed to be respected. Therefore, in the absence 
of unified cultural polities in these newly independent states, territory 
became the common denominator. That in itself, though, enacts colonial 
violence, and, if we are serious about overcoming these legacies, then 
we should be willing to let go of territoriality in this area, and embrace 
the fact that, as we already knew before the United Nations was 
founded, culture and cultural heritage belong with peoples, rather than 
with land. Heritage gives people its continuity, rather than give territory 
its stability.78 That the two align is more a matter of coincidence and 
colonial violence than one of purpose. In fact, even the International 
Court of Justice (notably conservative in basic matters of international 
law) has, in a recent case, recognized that culture and territory can be 
separated.79
In the context of the Anthropocene, decoupling heritage from 
territory means that migrant and refugee groups are entitled to the 
full gamut of their cultural rights, and entitlements to the heritage that 
binds them together as a community. Thus, states of origin must allow 
these groups to carry their own heritage with them if they are in fact 
abandoning the polity as a group, and resettle said heritage in their new 
country. Likewise, the receiving state should accommodate the new 
heritage of the entering migrant or refugee group, not only by protecting 
their right to keep their artifacts, but also by creating the conditions 
through which their intangible cultural heritage can be practiced and 
safeguarded. It is in the interest of the receiving state, after all, that 
these entering groups feel welcome and accepted, and, as numerous 
examples show, the heritage of migrant and refugee groups often does 
become deeply enmeshed with the pre-existing heritage of that polity. 
That the law as is does not reflect that common wisdom has more to do 
with the law being dated than it being a disincentive or prohibition to 
receiving state action.
Thinking about international law’s relationship to culture and 
cultural heritage more broadly, we have that international cultural 
78  Ibid, 44-45.
79  International Court of Justice, Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso / Niger), Judgment 
of 16 April 2013.
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heritage law, and the imperative of safeguarding the culture of migrant 
and refugee groups, helps us understand the artificiality of the ties 
between international legal rights and obligations to territory. As territory 
becomes an increasingly threatened constant in the Anthropocene, 
international law would do well to rethink this artificial and contingent 
relationship, and to allow itself to become the instrument of human 
emancipation the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have promised, 
but are yet to fulfill.
Decoupling international law on culture from territory also implies 
diminishing the overwhelming influence of state sovereignty on the 
field.80 An authority vacuum is thus created, and one that could and 
should aptly be filled by other representatives of the international 
community whose interest is not on their immediate state-centric 
institutional interests, but who can act as spokespeople for affected 
communities. Ideally, of course, communities themselves would have 
a voice in decision making about their heritage in the context of forced 
relocation, but, should that not be possible, international or regional 
organizations can act as their representatives, as long as they understand 
that their focus is not on the protection of their own existence, that of 
a class of experts, or of heritage as an end in itself. Rather, the goal is 
to promote the cultural heritage of migrant and refugee communities 
in these communities’ own terms, and for their benefit wherever they 
relocate.
VII. CONCLUSION
The rise of the Anthropocene presents a number of challenges to 
international law. But with challenges come opportunities to overcome 
80  Alternatively, with the emergence of deterritorialized states, things can remain the 
same. See Rosemary Rayfuse and Emily Crawford, “Climate Change and Statehood” 
in Rosemary Rayfuse and Shirley V. Scott, eds.,  International Law in the Era of Cli-
mate Change, Edward Elgar Publishers, 2012; Maxine Burkett, “The Nation Ex-Situ: 
On climate change, deterritorialized nationhood and the post-climate era”, Climate 
Law, no. 2, 2011, 369 (arguing that “”cultural identity will survive territory even at a 
significant distance”).
24
Moving Cultures: Engaging Refugee and Migrant Cultural Rights
internal barriers to international legal ordering that predated our 
imminent predicament as a civilization. Chief among them, as this 
article has shown, is the divide in international law between culture 
and biology. This divide creates a sense of immediacy and crisis in 
international law that is short-sighted and prevents international law 
from achieving its own objectives by obscuring key elements that 
need to be taken into account when addressing the needs of human 
communities. Flowing from that gap is international law’s insistence 
on individual (and thus easily translated into biological) over group 
(inherently cultural) interests being at the forefront of international 
legal efforts.
But a brief look into the evolution of applicable norms underscores 
their contingencies, and shows that, much like the biology-culture 
divide, territoriality as a necessary link between cultural heritage in 
international law is also not a given. Breaking away from this link 
allows us to effectively safeguard the culture and heritage of migrant 
groups, and, most importantly, it serves as a powerful reminder to 
ourselves of international law’s purpose. Culture can be a bridge 
towards humanity, and beyond the increasingly artificial constructs 
and anchors of statehood and territoriality, but we need to remember 
that culture is only as good as the community that practices, lives, and 
carries it onwards. 
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